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Success, Survive or Escape? Aspirations and
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David Chivers
Abstract
I present a model of occupational choice where an agent decides
whether to invest in a project that yields risky returns or a project
that yields safe returns. An agents utility is a¤ected by the presence
of an aspiration level which will only be satised if their nal income is
above the poverty line. I show that agents who are su¢ ciently above
the poverty line will invest in the risky project and are able to aspire
for success. An agent, however, who is just above the poverty line,
may be so concerned about falling into poverty that they choose to
invest in the safe project. These individuals aspire only to survive.
Alternatively, if an agent is su¢ ciently below the poverty line, then
they will invest in the risky project even if expected returns are lower
than the safe project. These individuals have "nothing left to lose" and
therefore aspire to escape. Two forms of poverty traps emerge from
the resulting equilibria: one above the poverty line, and one below the
poverty line. Finally, I o¤er empirical support for the model based on
individual level survey data across a large number of countries.
JEL Classication: D31, D81, E24, L26, O11.
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1 Introduction
What does it mean to have aspirations? We tend to think of an aspiration
as above and beyond the position in life we are in now: to achieve great
things, to become rich, to be a success. However, for some individuals, the
aim is simply to survive, to maintain the status quo. This is born out of a
fear that falling below their status quo is far worse than the current state
they are in. For others, the fear of the status quo is already being felt, and
will take any chance to escape their current situation. What aspirations have
in common, however, is that they are formed in the present about the kind
of future we want and the kind of future we hope will never happen. As a
consequence, an aspiration is dened by the relative weights we attach to the
overall probability of success and failure for a given objective.
The natural question one turns to is how we form our aspirations. One
could argue that our aspirations are heterogenous and innate, shaped by our
parents, or perhaps our culture. Despite our own, idiosyncratic aspirations,
we may also share a common aspiration, to be free from poverty, for example.
If this is the case, the e¤ect of this common aspiration will di¤er depending on
our own proximity to the poverty line. This will have important implications
for wealth-enhancing investment decisions.
For example, starting a business can make individuals extremely rich
or leave them desperately poor. Faced with the decision either to start a
business or obtain a safer form of income, someone who is relatively wealthy
can aspire for success, and may see this as a risk worth taking. Someone who
is just above the poverty line, however, may view this business opportunity
as a risk too far. This desire to maintain the status quo is born out of a
fear that if their business failed they would fall into poverty. Someone who is
already below the poverty line will have "nothing left to lose" and may view
starting a business as the only way to escape poverty. This paper will show
how individual aspirations aspirations to avoid poverty can result in poverty
traps.
Within the theoretical poverty trap literature, many of the results are
driven by moves away from the standard neoclassical paradigm, in order to
create multiple equilibria and path-dependence (i.e., long-run outcomes are
dependent on initial conditions). These include non-convexities in technolo-
gies, market incompleteness (often in the form of credit constraints) and
imperfect functioning of institutions (see Azariadis 1996; 2005 for surveys).
More recently there has been a focus on the role of aspirations in the
creation and persistence of poverty traps (see Ray, 2006 for an introduction).
Aspirations may be conditioned by relative economic status, as in Moav
and Neeman (2010) and Ray and Robson (2012), or by parentsaspirations
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for their childrens education, as in Mookherjee et al. (2010). For example,
Genicot and Ray (2016) develop a model in which there is an endogenous re-
lationship between economic outcomes and individual aspirations, and hence
income and the distribution of income are jointly determined.
Dalton et al. (2016) show how a poverty trap can occur when e¤ort a¤ects
nal wealth. The optimal amount of e¤ort chosen will be based on whether
an individual believes they can meet their aspiration level. As a result,
aspiration failure will be self-fulling. Blackburn and Chivers (2015) show
how the e¤ects of aspirationally-induced loss aversion can result in persistent
inequality due to the fear or falling below a certain level of income. However,
all of these models treat aspirations as unidirectional: either success (as in
Genicot and Ray, 2016 and Dalton et al., 2016) or survival (as in Blackburn
and Chivers, 2015).
The notion that aspirations of the poor may di¤er, can be traced back
to Banerjee (2000), who suggests that there are two distinct and competing
views of poverty: "poverty as desperation" and "poverty as vulnerability".
Banerjee (2000) argues that, if we view poverty as a form of desperation, the
poor would wish to invest in wealth-enhancing projects, but may be denied
credit. However, if one views poverty as vulnerable individuals facing the
possibility of falling further into poverty, then the poor may forgo investment
in a risky project. This paper di¤ers to Banerjees (2000), as it shows how
both these types of behaviours can stem from aspirations alone, without the
need of appealing to non-convexities in technologies.
The approach of this paper is driven by recent advancements in decision
theory - specically, aspiration levels. Aspiration levels occur when individ-
uals are faced with a risky prospect. The individual evaluates the project
based on their weighted preferences of the overall probability of success or
failure. What individuals deem to be a success or failure is judged with
respect to some aspirational outcome (see Diecidue and Van de Ven, 2008).
Aspiration levels are similar to reference points that occur in loss-averse
preferences developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their seminal
work on prospect theory. Loss aversion is the notion that individuals have a
stronger preference to avoid losses than to obtain gains, relative to a particu-
lar reference point. Although there is a subtle di¤erence between aspiration
levels and reference points, the two are linked (see Lopes and Oden, 1999,
for a comparison). Aspiration levels are based on probabilities and view out-
comes as nal states. Conversely, reference points are a behavioural concept
linked to changes in wealth. These features give rise to a discontinuity in the
utility function for aspiration levels and a kinked utility function under loss
aversion.
The presence of aspirational levels in risky projects has been found in
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a number of experimental and empirical studies (see e.g., Holthausen 1981;
Mezias 1988; Langer and Weber 2001; Mezias et al. 2002). There is also a
growing literature examining aspirations in developing countries. Pasquier-
Doumer and Brandon (2015) examine educational investment among indige-
nous and non-indigenous children in Peru. They nd that although indige-
nous children have lower aspirations than non-indigenous children, this is
mostly explained by the e¤ects of socioeconomic status.
Aspirations have also been the subject of a number of randomised con-
trol trials (see Bogliancino and Gozález-Gallo, 2015, Macours and Vakis,
2009). Bernard et al. (2014) conducted an experiment in order to examine
peer e¤ects in the formation of aspirations in rural Ethiopia. The treatment
group of individuals were invited to watch a documentary about successful
entrepreneurs from similar communities. A rst control group watched an en-
tertainment programme, while a second control group were simply surveyed.
They found that aspirations were higher among the treated, but unchanged
amongst the control groups.
From a development perspective, these aspirational e¤ects are important,
as risky, wealth-enhancing investment decisions are key to understanding the
creation and persistence of poverty traps.
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. In section 2, I examine
the e¤ect of aspirations on wealth-enhancing investment decisions in a sto-
chastic overlapping generation model. In section 3, I test the implications
of this model by using individual-level survey data across a large sample of
countries and create a linear probability model in order to identify a common
aspiration level among entrepreneurs. Finally, I o¤er a conclusion in section
4.
2 The Model
Consider a small, open economy with a unit population of two-period lived
agents in an overlapping generations framework. Generations are connected
through transfers of a productive technology such as human capital (as in
Lucas, 1988), or stock of knowledge (as in Romer, 1986). In the rst pe-
riod of life, young agents choose to invest in a risky project or invest in a
safe project with guaranteed returns. The risky project may be opportunity-
driven (which yields higher returns on average than the safe project) or ne-
cessity driven (which yields lower returns on average than the safe option).
In the nal period of life, old agents consume the realised output based on
their investment choices. Agents utility is governed by a common aspiration
level in the form of Diecidue and Van de Ven (2008).
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2.1 Preferences
Agents have identical preferences and derive utility from lifetime income such
that ut = u(xt+1): Following Diecidue and Van de Ven (2008), agents have a
common aspiration level in their utility function x such that their expected
utility is given as Vt = E(xt+1   x) + P (xt+1  x)  P (xt+1 < x): The
term P (xt+1 < x); is the probability of failing to attain their aspiration, and
P (xt+1  x); is the probability of achieving their aspiration. Whether one
views an aspiration as a disutility of failure of being below x; or an added
utility of success from being above x; is inconsequential to the model. The
only requirement is that the combined weights of success and failure do not
cancel each other out (where for  = ): Consequently, I set  = 0 in order
to simplify the model, and therefore assume agents face an added disutility
based on the probability of failure to meet their aspiration level of income.1
Let xt+1 and x denote, the actual and aspiration levels of income of an
agent, respectively. The expected payo¤ to each agent is given by
Vt = E(xt+1   x)  P (xt+1 < x); (1)
where  > 0.
2.2 Technologies
There exists two types of risky projects that require a xed amount of capital
k > 0 on start-up: an "opportunity-driven" project, where it = kB, and a
"necessity driven" project, where it = kb. If agents do not invest in a risky
project, they can invest in a safe project which requires no capital investment,
where it = 0: As agents are not endowed with any physical capital at the start
of life, agents must borrow to start a business (as in Banerjee and Newman,
1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993). Credit markets, however, function perfectly,
and hence capital is borrowed at the world rate of interest r.2
The formation of the next periods productive technology ht+1 will depend
on a fraction  of last periods productive technology ht; where  2 (0; 1).
An opportunity-driven entrepreneurs productive technology will increase by
B from investment, whereas a necessity-driven entrepreneur will increase by
b: An individual who does not start a business and persues the safe project
will increase their productive technology by s: The hierarchy of investments
1It is trivial to show what happens when  > 0 : Adding this to the model simply
strengthens the e¤ects of aspirations (see Blackburn and Chivers, 2015).
2Although credit markets function perfectly, I assume agents cannot borrow to self
insure against any negative shocks. See Antunes et al. (2015) for a model in which
entrepreneurs face a distorted credit market.
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is given as B > s > b. The evolution of the productive technology will
diverge depending on the investment decision of the agent such that
ht+1 =
8<:
ht +B if it = kB;
ht + s if it = 0;
ht + b if it = kb:
(2)
Although next periods productive technology ht+1 is known, the next
periods output yt+1 is uncertain for risky projects. This will be important
for the agents investment decision as output yt+1 is simply the agents income
xt+1: Output for both risky projects and the safe project is expressed as
yt+1 =

A(1 + t+1)ht+1 if it = kB or it = kb;
Aht+1 if it = 0;
(3)
where total factor productivity A is a positive constant. The term t+1 rep-
resents a technology shock and is designed to reect the fact that the returns
to entrepreneurship are comparatively risky compared to paid employment.3
The shock t+1; is uniformly distributed on the interval ( a; a); with
probability density function f(t+1) = 12a(a < 1):
4 This implies that the
expected value of this shock is zero E[t+1] =
aZ
 a
t+1f(t+1)dt+1 = 0; and
that the variance (and therefore risk) of the shock, is determined by a which is
given as var (t+1) = E

(t+1   E (t+1))2

= E(2t+1) =
aZ
 a
2t+1f(t+1)dt+1 =
a2
3
:
2.3 Incomes
Using equations (2) and (3); and noting an old agents output yt+1 is their
income xt+1, an agent can obtain the following:
xt+1 =
8<:
A(1 + t+1)(ht +B)   (1 + r)k if it = kB;
A(ht + s ) if it = 0;
A(1 + t+1)(ht + b)   (1 + r)k if it = kb:
(4)
3It is possible to rewrite this model with risk entering the productive technology rather
than output. The subsequent analysis would be unchanged with the only di¤erence being
the transitional dynamics of the model.
4One could argue that the cost of the project, and level of risk, may vary between an
opportunity-driven project and a necessity-driven project. However, I assume the cost of
the project, and the level of risk, is the same for simplicity of exposition.
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Correspondingly, the expected nal income becomes
E [xt+1] =
8<:
A(ht +B)  (1 + r)k if it = kB;
A(ht + s) if it = 0;
A(ht + b)  (1 + r)k if it = kb.
(5)
The evolution of incomes captures a number of stylised facts about the
entrepreneurial earnings distribution.5 Although the returns to entrepre-
neurship are lower than paid employment on average, the returns to entre-
preneurship have a much wider distribution (see Lin et al., 2000, Hamilton,
2000, and Herranz etl al. 2015). Furthermore, entrepreneurs tend to be
drawn disproportionately from each end of the ability distribution and are
remunerated accordingly (Åstebro et al., 2011).
I assume that on average the opportunity-driven, risky project yields a
greater return that the safe project such that B > s: To make the analysis
non-trivial, however, I assume that the presence of uncertainty (via t+1) in
the production of the opportunity-driven project means that it is not for
certain that the risky project will always guarantee a higher level of income
than the safe project. I also assume that the necessity-driven project will
on average be lower than the safe project such that s > b, but there is a
possibility once production takes place that the necessity-driven project can
yield a higher income. As a result of these two assumptions, the parameter
restrictions B(1   a)  s and b(1 + a)  s are needed. I now analyse the
occupational choice facing individuals above and below the poverty line.
2.4 Non-poor Agents
A non-poor agent is dened as an individual who can be above the poverty
line x if they invest in the safe project, such that A(ht + s )  x: The
choice this agent faces will be whether to invest in the opportunity-driven
project or the safe project. This is because both of these investments will
always be preferable to the necessity-driven project, as the expected value of
opportunity-driven project is always higher than a necessity-driven project,
B > b. As individuals consume all output in the last period of life, one can
simply substitute equation (5) into the utility function in equation (1). For
agents that invest in the safe project their expected utility becomes
Vtjit=0 = A[ht + s]  x: (6)
5With some further parameter restrictions one could trivially use a convex function that
represents all entrepreneurial activities - returns start o¤ smaller than the safe project and
eventually eclipse them. However, for demonstrative purposes, I use the above with no
loss of generality.
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Notice that as non-poor agents are already above their aspiration level, in-
vesting in a safe project does not result in any disutility associated with
failure.
By contrast, suppose that the decision to invest in the opportunity-driven
project may, or may not, satisfy an individuals aspiration level (i.e., A(1 +
t+1)(ht+B)  (1+ r)k  x), or A(1+t+1)(ht+B)  (1+ r)k < x): It
is now possible to dene a critical value of the productivity shock bt+1 such
that an individual would meet their aspiration, if t+1  bt+1; or fail to meet
their aspiration if, t+1 < bt+1: In order to determine bt+1 one must nd the
the level of t+1 which satises the following equation
A(1 + bt+1)(ht +B)  (1 + r)kB = x: (7)
Accordingly, the probability of failing to attain aspirations is P (xt+1 <
x) = P (xt+1 < bt+1) = R bt+1 a f(t+1)dt+1 = bt+1+2 : By substituting this
into equation (1), the expected utility of an individual that invests in the
risky, opportunity-driven project is given as
Vtjit=kB = A (ht +B)  (1 + r)k   
bt+1 + a
2a

: (8)
The decision to invest in the opportunity-driven project rests on whether
the opportunity-driven project yields higher utility than the safe project,
where Vtjit=k > Vtjit=0: By using equations (6) and (8), this condition is
given as
A (B   s)  (1 + r)k  
bt+1 + a
2a

: (9)
Rearranging the expression in equation (7) delivers
bt+1 = (1 + r)k + x   A(ht +B)
A(ht +B)
 (ht); (10)
where h(ht) < 0. Given the above, the condition for investment in the
opportunity-driven project is expressed as A(B s) (1+r)k  

(ht)+a
2a

:
This condition is more likely to be satised the higher an agents initial
knowledge ht, the lower the weight of aspirations ; and the lower the level
of uncertainty a.6
6The e¤ect of a follows bt+1 < 0 in (8). This is due to the fact that for a non-poor
agent A(ht + B)   (1 + r)k   x > 0 must hold. If this condition does not hold, then
investment in the opportunity-driven project will never be chosen, as the expected income
from this investment would be less than the aspiration level an agent. Or in other words,
they would always choose to invest in the safe asset.
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The condition which determines whether or not a non-poor agent invests
in an opportunity-driven project is dened for any ht; such that ht  bhB; in
A (B   s)  (1 + r)k  
0@
bhB+ a
2a
1A : (11)
2.5 Poor Agents
A poor agent is dened as an individual whose income cannot be above the
poverty line x if they invest in the safe project, such that A(ht+s ) < x: I
assume, initially, that poor individuals do not have access to the opportunity-
driven project. This is not a crucial assumption for the model but is imple-
mented to highlight how aspirations will a¤ect poor and non-poor agents
di¤erently. As mentioned earlier, one could replace both risky projects with
a convex function of knowledge accumulation: returns to entrepreneurship
start o¤smaller than the safe project and eventually outgrow them. Imposing
the assumption that poor individuals do not have access to the opportunity-
driven project is equivalent to imposing further parameter restrictions on a
model with a convex function of knowledge accumulation. Nevertheless, I
return to the consequences of relaxing this assumption in the discussion of
equilibrium outcomes.
If a poor agent invests in the safe project, then the presence of the disutil-
ity of being below their aspiration level will always be felt. By using equations
(5) and (1), the poor agents expected utility when choosing the safe project
becomes
Vtjit=0 = A[ht + s]  x   : (12)
Although on average the necessity-driven project yields a lower return than
the safe project, as s > b; this is not a certainty. If a poor agent chooses
the necessity-driven project then there is a chance that the project may take
them over the poverty line x (i.e., A(1 + t+1)(ht + b)  (1 + r)k  x), or
A(1 + t+1)(ht + b)  (1 + r)k < x): Hence, it is possible to nd a critical
value of the productivity shock bt+1 that takes the individuals nal income
over the poverty line. The expected utility of the necessity-driven project is
therefore given as
Vtjit=kb = A (ht + b)  x   (1 + r)k   
bt+1 + a
2a

: (13)
The occupational choice for the poor agent is determined by comparing
the respective utilities of the necessity-driven project and the safe project.
Substituting (13) and (12) in Vtjit=kb  Vtjit=0; one obtains the expression
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that would result in the agent having a higher utility under necessity-driven
entrepreneurship than the safe project


a  bt+1
2a

 A[s  b] + (1 + r)k: (14)
I therefore determine bt+1 in a similar manner to non-poor agents in (7)
noting h(ht) < 0. The condition 

a (h)
2a

 A[s   b] + (1 + r)k is more
likely to hold the higher the poor agents initial level of knowledge ht. As
poor agents move closer towards their aspirational level, they are more likely
to invest in a project that would see them escape poverty. As a result, this
condition is more likely to be satised the greater the strength of aspirations
 and the greater the level of risk a:
If the poor agent chooses the safe project or fails to meet their aspira-
tion under the necessity-driven project, they will still experience the negative
utility of being below their aspiration. Accordingly the condition for invest-
ment the necessity-driven for a poor agent is dened for any ht; such that
ht  bhb; in

0@a 
bhb
2a
1A  A[s  b] + (1 + r)k: (15)
2.6 Equilibrium Outcomes
There exists a critical value ht which determines whether an individual can, or
cannot, be above the poverty line x: This critical value determines whether
the agent is non-poor (A(ht + s )  x) ; or poor (A(ht + s ) < x) ; and is
expressed as bhx = x   sA
A
: (16)
Using this result together with equations (11) and (15); it is possible to
dene the threshold levels of the initial productive technology bhb; bhx andbhB. These threshold levels of the initial productive technology determine
the long-run consequence of each generations investment decisions. The
evolution of this process for all initial levels of knowledge is described by
ht+1 =
8>>><>>>:
ht + s if ht < bhb;
ht + b if bhb  ht < bhx ;
ht + s if bhx  ht < bhB;
ht +B if ht  bhB:
(17)
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Depending on the initial level of knowledge of the rst generation ht;
the economy will converge to high, medium or low steady-state (hH =
B
1  ,
hM =
s
1 or h

L =
b
1  ):
7 The dynamics of this process are shown in Figure
1.
[Figure 1 about here]
If an individual has an initial productive technology ht < bhb ; then they
and their future generations will invest in the safe project. This occurs
until the accumulation of knowledge over generations reaches bhb where that
particular generation will invest in a necessity-driven project. Even though
on average this project will yield lower returns than the safe project, due
to the presence of risk in the production function it is possible that some
generations will reach their aspiration level and escape poverty. However,
as agents only pass on knowledge to their future dynasties, any favourable
productivity shock that allows a generation to escape poverty will only benet
that generation. In this model, knowledge determines future generations
productivity, not nal income. Hence, dynasties whose initial productive
technology is ht < bhx ; will converge to a low steady-state hL; and always
invest in necessity-driven projects.
Individuals with initial productive technology ht  bhx have the choice
of investing in an opportunity-driven project that yields higher expected
returns than the safe project. Dynasties whose initial productive technology
is ht < bhB; are su¢ ciently concerned, however, by the possibility of falling
below their aspiration level and hence invest in the safe project. It follows
that dynasties whose initial productive technology is bhx  ht < bhB will
converge to the mid-level steady-state hM
Finally, if an individual has initial productive technology ht  bhB; then
they and their future generations will always invest in the opportunity-driven
project. Consequently, these dynasties will converge to a high-level steady
state hH : This is not to say that some generations will not fall into poverty
during a bad productivity shock. The level of knowledge, however, they pass
on, is not a¤ected by this bad productivity shock and so will not a¤ect the
upward trajectory of their dynasties.
From equations (11) and (15) it can be shown that bhb (a; ) < 0 andbhB(a; ) > 0. Hence, increasing the level of risk (a) or the strength of
aspirations () moves bhb to the left and bhB to the right in Figure 1.
7One could view this model as either understanding the emergence of inequality across
economies (as this analysis does), or the long-run persistence of inequality within an
economy. The transitional dynamics depend on the initial level of knowledge for the
former and on the initial distribution of knowledge within an economy for the latter.
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2.7 Discussion
One of the innovations of this model is that poverty traps can arise purely as a
result of the nature of preferences, rather than the structure of technologies,
or functioning of markets. The resulting equilibria are also reminiscent of
Banerjees (2000) two types of poverty. Those with initial wealth su¢ ciently
below the poverty line bhx are experiencing poverty of desperation. Those
with initial wealth just above bhx are concerned about falling into poverty and
hence will not invest in risky projects. This can be thought of as experiencing
poverty of vulnerability.
The analysis of the model has so far concentrated on circumstances where
aspiration levels enter an agents investment decision. If, however, aspirations
are too high for the necessity-driven project, where the best outcome of the
project would never satisfy the agents aspiration level, ht + b(1 + a)  
(1 + r)k < x, individuals would simply always invest in the safe project.
These agents will always su¤er the disutility of being below their aspiration
level. Similarly, if aspirations were too low for the opportunity-driven project,
then the worst outcome of the project would not take them below their aspi-
ration level, ht + B(1  a)  (1 + r)k > x. These individuals would never
experience the possibility of falling below their aspiration level and therefore
always invest in the opportunity-driven project. Under these conditions, a
policy that lowers aspirations that are too high may encourage individuals
into a wealth-enhancing investment, such as in Dalton et al. (2016). In gen-
eral, individuals with high aspirations must not only have high aspirations,
but must also be su¢ ciently induced to act in order to achieve those aspi-
rations. Hence, the strength of our aspirations (how much we care about
whether we see our aspirations succeed or fail) as well as the level of aspira-
tion (if our aspirations are too high we may not be su¢ ciently motivated to
act on them) are important for the development process.
Finally, if the assumption that poor individuals do not have access to
the opportunity-driven project is relaxed, then there will only be two steady
states, hM and h

H : This is because individuals below the poverty line bhx will
always invest in the opportunity-driven project in order to escape poverty.
Over generations, poor individuals will escape poverty and converge to the
mid-level steady-state hM . One of the reasons for implementing this assump-
tion is to show that su¢ ciently poor individuals would invest in risky invest-
ments, even if the average returns of the investment are less than the safe
project. In essence, they act as if they are risk seeking as they have "nothing
left to lose". If this assumption is removed, however, one can also think of
other reasons why poor individuals are less likely to invest in an opportunity-
driven project, and more likely to invest in a necessity-driven project. These
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reasons are explored in the next section.
3 Empirical Evidence
The model outlined above demonstrates how aspiration levels are important
from a development perspective, as wealth-enhancing investments are often
risky. The most obvious example of a wealth-enhancing investment that en-
tails a substantive amount of risk is entrepreneurship. This is shown by the
fact that the spread of income earnings is much larger for entrepreneurs than
workers (see Hamilton, 2000; Lin et al., 2000). Furthermore, the probability
of a business failing is much higher than being laid o¤ from a job.8
The importance of entrepreneurship as a source of innovation and growth
dates back to Schumpeter (1911). A simple plot (shown in Figure 2) of
the percentage of entrepreneurs within a country on a countrys level of
development, however, shows a seemingly counter-intuitive relationship.9
[Figure 2 about here]
One of the reasons for this inverse relationship between entrepreneurship
and development is due to problems in measuring what constitutes an entre-
preneur. One can split the motivations for entrepreneurship into two types:
opportunity-driven and necessity-driven (see Lunati, 2010). Opportunity-
driven entrepreneurs are more likely to start frims that are more protable,
innovative and grow, compared to necessity-driven entrepreneurs. This is be-
cause opportunity-driven entrepreneurs choose to take advantage of a busi-
ness venture, whereas necessity-driven entrepreneurs, start a rm because
they have no other means of income (through paid employment, for exam-
ple). These two types of entrepreneurs have di¤erent aspirations for their
rms. Opportunity-driven entrepreneurs aspire to improve their current sit-
uation and can therefore aspire for success. Necessity-driven entrepreneurs
feel they have no other option but to enter entrepreneurship and aspire to
escape their current situation.
8In the US for example, the Small Business Association (2016) report a 78.5% chance
of a rm surviving past their rst year, compared to a 1% probability of being laid o¤
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016).
9Due to data availability, I use average rates of nascent entrepreneurs by country, across
the period 2001-2010, from GEM survey data, and use average GDP per capita from the
World Bank. Wennekers et al. (2005) nds a more intuitive U-shaped relationship between
entrepreneurship and development, using a sample of 36 countries, within the GEM survey,
in 2005. However, the upturn in entrepreneurial rates after a certain level of development
is relatively small.
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In order to understand what drives the aspirations of these two types of
entrepreneurs, I take advantage of a unique data set, the Global Entrepre-
neurship Monitor survey (GEM). The GEM survey has detailed information
on start-up activities across a large number of individuals and spanning a
wide variety of countries. The sample I use contains 44466 individual obser-
vations, within 86 di¤erent countries, over a 10 year period (see Table 3 in the
Appendix for the list of countries in the sample). One of the main advantages
of the GEM survey is that it asks individuals their motivation in starting a
business, and catches individuals at the start of the entrepreneurial process. I
code individuals who report being in the process of starting a business due to
"taking advantage of a business opportunity" as opportunity-driven, whereas
those reporting starting a business due to a "lack of a better alternative", I
code as necessity-driven. If I now plot the proportion of entrepreneurs that
report being opportunity-driven on development (Figure 3) we see a positive
relationship.10
[Figure 3 about here]
One of the implications of the model, outlined in Section 2, is that those
su¢ ciently above their aspiration level will take on an opportunity-driven
project to aspire for success, and those individuals su¢ ciently below their
aspiration level will take on a necessity-driven project and aspire to escape
poverty. One way of testing this implication is considering the e¤ect of
an individuals income level on their motivation for starting a rm. If an
entrepreneur has a high income level, they would be less worried about
falling into poverty, and therefore would be more likely to only take on
opportunity-driven investments. If, however, an individual has a low in-
come, they would arguably be more concerned about falling into poverty or
escaping poverty. Therefore, low-income entrepreneurs are more likely to
have a necessity driven motive. As a consequence, I test the hypothesis that
the higher the entrepreneurs income, controlling for other factors, the more
likely they are to be opportunity-driven, and the less likely they are to be
necessity-driven.
The GEM survey reports income entrepreneurs surveyed in three cate-
gories: low, medium and high, with respect to the distribution of the coun-
try in which they are surveyed. The income variable, therefore, captures
aspirations to avoid relative poverty within a country, as opposed to relative
poverty across countries or absolute poverty. To isolate the e¤ects of income
10Simiarly, Ács and Varga (2005) nd opportunity-driven entrepreneurship has a positive
e¤ect on development whereas necessity-driven entrepreneurship has no e¤ect.
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on entrepreneurial motivation I control for a number of factors reported in
Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
I add dummy variables for the level of education obtained, as well as for
age categories. This is because human capital and experience are likely to
increase idea creation, which may lead to opportunity-driven entrepreneur-
ship. Furthermore, those with high levels of human capital and experience
may have better employment opportunities, which would reduce the chance
of becoming a necessity entrepreneur. The employment status of individu-
als will be of particular importance for the motivations of starting a rm,
especially whether an individual is unemployed. I also control for whether
an individual answered "yes" or "no" to the statement "you have the knowl-
edge, skill and experience required" to become an entrepreneur. This can
be thought of as a control for previous business experience or entrepreneurs
condence in their own ability.
I include all individuals that are in the process of the starting a rm
(nascent entrepreneurs) between the ages of 18-65. Although I use individ-
ual level data, the survey does not track individuals over time. One drawback
of this is that it is impossible to check for consistency of answers. For ex-
ample, if individuals change their mind about the motivation for starting
their business. Finally, I use country and time xed e¤ects to control for any
macroeconomic e¤ects which may inuence an individuals motivations for
starting a rm.
It follows that the linear probability model is expressed as
Motivationij;t = aj + t +X
0
ij;t + Incomeij;t + "ij;t
where Motivationij;t is the dependent binary variable (either opportunity-
driven or necessity-driven) at time, t; for an individual, i; within a country
j. The independent variable of interest is denoted by Incomeij;t, aj denotes
country xed e¤ects, t year xed e¤ects, and X 0ij;t is a vector of control
variables for education, employment, perceived experience and age.
3.1 Results
Table 2 reports the results of the empirical analysis. The rst and second
columns show the results of the linear probability model when the dependent
variable is opportunity-driven and necessity-driven, respectively. Given the
binary nature of the dependent variable, it is not surprising that most of
the results are inversely related. I report both, however, for convenience
purposes.
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[Table 2 about here]
The results suggest entrepreneurs are more likely to report their motiva-
tion for starting a rm is opportunity driven when income is larger. Com-
pared to poor-income entrepreneurs, having a medium-level income increases
the probability of being opportunity driven by 0.049, and having high-level
income increases the probability by 0.119. In regards to the other variables,
education increases the likelihood of reporting being an opportunity-driven
entrepreneur at each level of education. These results are in line with ex-
pectations about human capital having a positive e¤ect on innovation and
employment opportunities. Being unemployed lowers the probability of be-
ing an opportunity-driven entrepreneur by -0.111 compared to a full-time
employed individual. This result is unsurprising given that entrepreneur-
ship is often used as a necessary route to escape unemployment. Perceived
entrepreneurial skill increases the likelihood of an opportunity-driven moti-
vation by 0.058. Whether this is interpreted as self-condence and/or ac-
tual entrepreneurial experience, it is in line with expected positive e¤ects of
condence and experience needed for opportunity-driven entrepreneurship.
Compared to 18-24 year olds, the e¤ect of age decreases the probability of
becoming an opportunity-driven entrepreneur, at each age interval. One may
nd these results surprising as older individuals have more experience and
have a longer time to amass funds for investment. However, this result could
be due to individuals accruing experience in their career as an employee. This
would subsequently reduce the incentive to switch to opportunity-driven en-
trepreneurship as earnings from paid employment are likely to increase with
experience.
There may be a signicant di¤erence between nascent entrepreneurs and
more established entrepreneurs. Nascent entrepreneurs include all individu-
als who engage with the entrepreneurial process. Established entrepreneurs,
however, only include entrepreneurs who are successful or who are more will-
ing to continue with their project. As a robustness check, I repeat the analysis
for individuals who report being owners of an established rm, as opposed to
those in the early process of entrepreneurship. The results are given in Table
4 in the Appendix and are similar in both size and e¤ect. The only major
di¤erence being whether an individual reports they are unemployed becomes
insignicant for necessity entrepreneurs. This is to be expected, however, as
most owners would categorise themselves as employed when surveyed.
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4 Conclusions
This paper has sought to highlight the e¤ects of individual aspirations on
the development process. It is common to associate aspirations with success
and achievement. The contribution of this paper is to show that the e¤ect
of aspirations, however, will be di¤erent depending on the circumstances an
individual faces. The model developed within this paper suggests that when
individuals share a common aspiration level, to be free from poverty, for
example, two di¤erent types of poverty traps occur. Individuals above the
poverty line may be su¢ ciently concerned about falling into poverty that they
decline investment in wealth-enhancing, risky projects. These individuals
invest in safe projects to survive. If individuals are below the poverty line,
their aspiration to escape poverty may be so strong that they are willing
to invest in risky projects, even if this risky project yields lower returns on
average than a less risky alternative.
One conclusion from this model is that those who invest in risky projects,
and who do not fear falling into poverty, are opportunity driven. Alterna-
tively, those who invest in risky projects who feel they have no other choice,
whether to escape poverty, or because they have no other means of income,
are necessity driven. As a consequence I test this implication using individ-
ual level, cross-county data. The subsequent ndings suggest the probability
of an entrepreneur being opportunity-driven, compared to poor individuals,
increases by 0.049 for mid-level income individuals, and 0.119 for high-level
income individuals.
One possible extension of this model is to examine the e¤ects of social
insurance on development. In the model described above, a social insur-
ance scheme, which prevents individuals falling below the poverty line, could
eliminate both poverty traps: individuals, therefore, could no longer be in
poverty, or be concerned about falling into poverty. How this social insurance
scheme is funded, however, may reduce incentives for individuals to invest
in risky, wealth-enhancing projects. This, however, rests on the assumption
that our common aspiration level is xed, such as the aspiration to avoid
absolute poverty. If our common aspiration level is to avoid relative poverty,
however, this would have implications for the distribution of earnings.
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Appendix
[Table 3 about here]
[Table 4 about here]
18
References
Ács, Z. J. and A. Varga (2005). "Entrepreneurship, agglomeration and
technological change." Small Business Economics 24(3): 323-334.
Antunes, A., T Cavalcanti and A. Villamil (2015). The E¤ects of Credit
Subsidies on Development." Economic Theory 58(1) 1-30.
Åstebro, T., J. Chen and P. Thompson (2011). "Stars and mists: self-
employment and labor market frictions."Management Science 57(11): 1999-
2017.
Azariadis, C. (1996). "The economics of poverty traps part one: complete
markets." Journal of Economic Growth 1(4): 449-486.
Azariadis, C. and J. Stachurski (2005). "Poverty traps." Handbook of
Economic Growth 1: 295-384.
Banerjee, A. V. (2000). "The two poverties." Nordic Journal of Political
Economy 26(2): 129-141.
Banerjee, A. V. and A. F. Newman (1993). "Occupational choice and the
process of development." Journal of Political Economy 101(2): 274-298.
Bernard, T. and A. Seyoum Ta¤esse (2014). "Aspirations: an approach
to measurement with validation using ethiopian data." Journal of African
Economies 23(2): 189-224.
Blackburn, K. and D. Chivers (2015). "Fearing the worst: the importance
of uncertainty for inequality." Economic Theory 60(2): 345-370.
Bogliacino, F. and I. González-Gallo (2015). "Aspirations, prospect the-
ory and entrepreneurship: evidence from Colombia." International Review of
Economics 62(3): 271-290.
Dalton, P. S., S. Ghosal and A. Mani (2016). "Poverty and aspirations
failure." The Economic Journal 126(590): 165-188.
Diecidue, E. and J. van de Ven (2008). "Aspiration level, probability
of sucess and failure, and expected utility." International Economic Review
49(2): 683-700.
Galor, O. and J. Zeira (1993). "Income distribution and macroeco-
nomics." The Review of Economic Studies 60(1): 35-52.
19
Genicot, G. and D. Ray (2016). "Aspirations and inequality." Economet-
rica. Forthcoming.
Hamilton, B. H. (2000). "Does entrepreneurship pay? An empirical
analysis of the returns to self-employment." Journal of Political Economy
108(3): 604-631.
Holthausen, D. M. (1981). "A risk-return model with risk and return
measured as deviations from a target return."The American Economic Re-
view 71(1): 182-188.
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979). "Prospect theory: An analysis of
decision under risk." Econometrica 47(2): 263-291.
Krasa, S., N. Herranz and A. Villamil (2015). Entrepreneurs, Risk Aver-
sion and Firm Dynamics.Journal of Political Economy 123(5), 1133-1176
Langer, T. and M. Weber (2001). "Prospect theory, mental accounting,
and di¤erences in aggregated and segregated evaluation of lottery portfolios."
Management Science 47(5): 716-733.
Lin, Z., Picot, G. and Compton, J. (2000). "The entry and exit dynamics
of self-employment in Canada." Small Business Economics 15(2): 105-125.
Lopes, L. L. and G. C. Oden (1999). "The role of aspiration level in
risky choice: a comparison of cumulative prospect theory and SP/A Theory."
Journal of Mathematical Psychology 43(2): 286-313.
Lucas, R. E. (1988). "On the mechanics of economic development." Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics 22(1): 3-42.
Lunati, M., J. M. Schlochtern, and G. Sargsyan (2010). "Measuring
entrepreneurshipthe OECD-Eurostat Entrepreneurship Indicators Programme."
OECD Statistics Brief (15): 1-12.
Macours, K. and R. Vakis (2014). "Changing households investment
behaviour through social interactions with local leaders: evidence from a
randomised transfer programme." The Economic Journal 124(576): 607-633.
Maggi, M. A. (2004). "A characterisation of S-shaped utility functions
displaying loss aversion." Mimeo Università degli Studi di Pavia.
Mezias, S. J. (1988). "Aspiration level e¤ects: An empirical investiga-
tion." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 10(4): 389-400.
20
Mezias, S. J., Y. R. Chen and P. R. Murphy (2002). "Aspiration-level
adaptation in an american nancial services srganization: a eld study."
Management Science 48(10): 1285-1300.
Moav, O. and Z. Neeman (2010). "Status and poverty." Journal of the
European Economic Association 8(2-3): 413-420.
Mookherjee, D., S Napel and D. Ray (2010). "Aspirations, segregation,
and occupational choice." Journal of the European Economic Association
8(1): 139-168.
Pasquier-Doumer, L. and F. Risso Brandon (2015). "Aspiration failure:
a poverty trap for indigenous children in Peru?" World Development 72(C):
208-223.
Payne, J. W. (2005). "It is whether you win or lose: the importance of
the overall probabilities of winning or losing in risky choice." Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty 30(1): 5-19.
Piketty, T. (1997). "The dynamics of the wealth distribution and the
interest rate with credit rationing." The Review of Economic Studies 64(2):
173-189.
Ray, D. (2006). "Aspirations, poverty, and economic change." In: A.
V. Banerjee, R. Benabou, and D. Mookherjee, eds. Understanding Poverty.
Oxford University Press: 409-421
Ray, D. and A. Robson (2012). "Status, intertemporal choice, and risk-
taking." Econometrica 80(4): 1505-1531.
Romer, P. M. (1986). "Increasing returns and long-run growth." Journal
of Political Economy 94(5): 1002-1037.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1934). The theory of economic development.
Wennekers, S., A. van Wennekers, R. Thurik and P Reynolds (2005).
"Nascent entrepreneurship and the level of economic development." Small
Business Economics 24(3): 293-309.
21
Figures and Tables
Figure 1
22
Figure 2
23
Figure 3
24
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Category Variable Mean S.D.
Nascant Entrepreneur Opportunity Driven 0.541 0.498
Necessity Driven 0.216 0.412
Established Entrepreneur Opportunity Driven 0.478 0.500
Necessity Driven 0.270 0.444
Income Poor Income 0.323 0.468
Middle Income 0.351 0.477
High Income 0.327 0.469
Education No School 0.035 0.184
Some Secondary 0.281 0.450
Secondary 0.316 0.465
Post Secondary 0.239 0.426
Grad Experience 0.129 0.336
Employment Employed 0.461 0.499
Unemployed 0.073 0.260
Part-time 0.073 0.259
Retired/Disabled 0.065 0.246
Homemaker 0.092 0.288
Student 0.05 0.218
Perceived Experience Entrep. Skill 0.486 0.500
Age 18-24 year olds 0.138 0.345
25-34 year olds 0.213 0.409
35-44 year olds 0.244 0.430
45-54 year olds 0.221 0.415
55-64 year olds 0.183 0.387
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Table 2: Regression Results - Nascent Entrepreneurs
FE
Opportunity
Driven
Necessity
Driven
Income Middle Income 0.049*** -0.047***
(0.012) (0.010)
High Income 0.119*** -0.112***
(0.018) (0.014)
Education Some Secondary 0.006 -0.033
(0.022) (0.023)
Secondary 0.043* -0.077***
(0.022) (0.021)
Post Secondary 0.075*** -0.126***
(0.023) (0.024)
Grad Experience 0.111*** -0.142***
(0.030) (0.027)
Employment Unemployed -0.111*** 0.129***
(0.021) (0.019)
Part-time -0.011 0.006
(0.011) (0.008)
Retired/Disabled -0.040** 0.036**
(0.018) (0.016)
Homemaker -0.056*** 0.088***
(0.017) (0.015)
Student 0.042*** -0.019
(0.014) (0.013)
Percieved Experience Entrep. Skill 0.058*** -0.041***
(0.010) (0.007)
Age 25-34 year olds -0.036*** 0.017**
(0.009) (0.008)
35-44 year olds -0.067*** 0.038***
(0.010) (0.011)
45-54 year olds -0.098*** 0.060***
(0.013) (0.012)
55-64 year olds -0.096*** 0.058***
(0.016) (0.015)
Constant 0.404*** 0.379***
(0.026) (0.029)
Year Dummies Yes Yes
County F.E. Yes Yes
Observations 44466 44466
Number of Countries 86 86
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Signicance levels:***p <0.01; **p <0.05; *p <0.1.
Low Income, Full Time, No Secondary and 18-24 year olds
were dropped from Income, Employment, Education
and Age respectively, due to multicollinearity.
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Table 3: Countries
Sample Countries
Algeria Costa Rica Iran New Zealand Switzerland
Angola Croatia Ireland Nigeria Syria
Argentina Czech Republic Israel Norway Thailand
Australia Denmark Italy Pakistan Tonga
Austria Dominican Republic Jamaica Panama Trinidad and Tobago
Bangladesh Ecuador Japan Peru Tunisia
Barbados Egypt Jordan Philippines Turkey
Belgium El Salvador Kazakhstan Poland Uganda
Belize Estonia Latvia Portugal United Kingdom
Bolivia Finland Lebanon Qatar United States
Bosnia and Herzegovina France Libya Russia Uruguay
Botswana Germany Lithuania Saudi Arabia Venezuela
Brazil Ghana Luxembourg Senegal Vietnam
Bulgaria Greece Macedonia Slovakia Yemen
Burkina Faso Guatemala Malawi Slovenia Zambia
Cameroon Hong Kong Malaysia South Africa
Canada Hungary Mexico South Korea
Chile Iceland Morocco Spain
China India Namibia Suriname
Colombia Indonesia Netherlands Sweden
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Table 4: Regression Results - Established Entrepreneurs
FE
Opportunity
Driven
Necessity
Driven
Income Middle Income 0.054*** -0.080***
(0.012) (0.011)
High Income 0.134*** -0.156***
(0.015) (0.016)
Education Some Secondary -0.004 -0.031**
(0.013) (0.014)
Secondary 0.051*** -0.092***
(0.014) (0.012)
Post Secondary 0.081*** -0.141***
(0.017) (0.015)
Grad Experience 0.115*** -0.157***
(0.022) (0.018)
Employment Unemployed -0.049* 0.033
(0.029) (0.030)
Part-time -0.017** -0.008
(0.007) (0.009)
Retired/Disabled 0.012 -0.057***
(0.020) (0.019)
Homemaker -0.038*** 0.042***
(0.013) (0.015)
Student 0.047** -0.102***
(0.022) (0.018)
Percieved Experience Entrep. Skill 0.086*** -0.070***
(0.010) (0.007)
Age 25-34 year olds -0.035*** -0.002
(0.012) (0.010)
35-44 year olds -0.064*** 0.025**
(0.013) (0.010)
45-54 year olds -0.096*** 0.053***
(0.014) (0.012)
55-64 year olds -0.111*** 0.056***
(0.014) (0.013)
Constant 0.314*** 0.533***
(0.027) (0.020)
Year Dummies Yes Yes
County F.E. Yes Yes
Observations 92830 92830
Number of Countries 86 86
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Signicance levels:***p <0.01; **p <0.05; *p <0.1.
Low Income, Full Time, No Secondary and 18-24 year olds
were dropped from Income, Employment, Education
and Age respectively, due to multicollinearity.
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